In the IPv6 protocol suite, ND is significant in ensuring the availability of neighbors on the local link. However, as network security problems intensify, the security of ND becomes a concern. Standards define several threats to ND security, some of which are described as follows.
Attack Method |
Description |
|---|---|
NS/NA spoofing |
An attacker sends an authorized node either an NS message with a bogus source link-layer address option or an NA message with a bogus target link-layer address option. Packets from the authorized node are then sent to this link-layer address. |
Neighbor unreachability detection (NUD) failure |
An attacker repeatedly sends forged NA messages in response to an authorized node's NUD NS messages so that the authorized node cannot detect neighbor unreachability. The consequences of this attack depend on why the neighbor became unreachable and how the authorized node would behave if it knew that the neighbor has become unreachable. |
Duplicate address detection (DAD) attack |
An attacker responds to every DAD attempt made by a host that accesses the network, claiming that the address is already in use. This is performed to ensure that the host will never obtain an address. |
Spoofed Redirect message |
An attacker uses the link-local address of the first-hop routing device to send a Redirect message to an authorized host. The authorized host accepts this message because it mistakenly considers that the message came from the first-hop routing device. |
Replay attack |
An attacker obtains valid messages and replays them. Even if NDP messages are cryptographically protected so that their contents cannot be forged, they are still prone to replay attacks. |
Bogus address prefix |
An attacker sends a bogus RA message specifying that some prefixes are on-link. If a prefix is on-link, a host will not send any packets that contain this prefix to the routing device. Instead, the host will send NS messages to attempt address resolution, but the NS messages are not responded to. As a result, the host is denied services. |
Malicious last-hop routing device |
An attacker multicasts bogus RA messages, or unicasts them in response to multicast RS messages, to a host attempting to discover a last-hop routing device. If the host selects the attacker as its default routing device, the attacker is able to function as a man-in-the-middle and intercept all messages exchanged between the host and its destination. |
To counter these threats, Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) specifies security mechanisms to extend ND. SEND defines cryptographically generated addresses (CGAs), CGA option, and Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) Signature option, which are used to ensure that the sender of an ND message is the owner of the message's source address. SEND also defines Timestamp and Nonce options to prevent replay attacks.
If an attacker uses an address that belongs to an authorized node, the attacker must use the node's public key for encryption. Otherwise, the receiver can detect the attempted attack after checking the CGA option. Even if the attacker obtains the public key of the authorized node, the receiver can still detect the attempted attack after checking the digital signature, which is generated from the sender's private key.
To enable IPv6 SEND to protect ND messages that carry CGA and RSA options, configure a CGA IPv6 address on an interface that sends ND messages.
If an interface needs to reject insecure ND messages, you can configure IPv6 SEND for it.
After IPv6 SEND is configured, constructing and parsing NS, NA, RS, and RA messages will consume extra time, which is used to construct and verify CGA and RSA options.